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A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR JUVENILES?THE IMPLICATIONS OF McKEIVER

I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the adjudication of a juvenile as delinquent in the
United States was accomplished in much the same manner as that
of the adult criminal.' The child was arrested, indicted by a grand
jury, tried by a petit jury, and punished with all of the constitutional
safeguards and procedures that accompanied the adult criminal
process.2 In addition, the juvenile was at one time incarcerated
under criminal law theories, viz., to protect society from harm and
to deter others from criminal acts.3
The early reformers in the field of juvenile justice felt that
criminal treatment methods were incompatible with what should
have been juvenile corrective measures. The cornerstone of the
reform movement was rehabilitation; a system of treatment that
would eliminate the harshness of the adult criminal process and
protect the juvenile from the stigmatizing effects of a criminal
adjudication. 4 In 1899, the state of Illinois passed the first Juvenile
Court Act and by 1925 juvenile court legislation had passed in
all but two states." The Juvenile Court Acts were generally upheld
on the theory that the state was merely acting as parens patriae
for the wayward child6 with a view to treatment and guidance
according to the needs of the youth rather than punishment for
his delinquent behavior.7 Consequently, the proposed issues in the
adjudication of a juvenile were not criminal responsibility, guilt
and punishment but rather understanding, guidance and protection.8
Procedural rules were relaxed and a highly informal court replaced
the traditional adversary system of adjudication. 9 The juvenile
1.
2.

Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909).
Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L.

REv.

547,

548

(1957)

Mack, supra note 1.
3. Comment, 10 STAN. L. REV. 471 (1958),
LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 4-17 (1940).

4.
5.

citing MICHAEL &

WECHSLER,

CRIMINAL

Mack, sup-a note 1, at 109.

REPORT OF PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2 & 1 (1967)
[hereafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].

6.

Paulsen, supra note 2, at 549.

7.

TASK FORCE REPOs'r at 3.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).

8.
9. Shwerin,
(1969).

The Juvenile Court Revolution in

Washington, 44 WASH.

L. REV. 421

626
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court even implemented its own vocabulary to emphasize its paternal
role; complaint, warrant, conviction, and sentence gave way to
the less imposing petition, summons, finding of involvement, and
disposition. 10 The informality of the juvenile court was justified
under the theory that the juvenile was taken into the custody of the
state for his own good and therefore he did not require the same
procedural protections afforded to an adult."'
II. THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION IN JUVENILE COURT
A.

PRE-Gault ATTEMPTS

AT REFORM

During the first half of the 20th century, any attempts to grant
the juvenile the due process protections afforded the adult criminal
were generally rebuffed.' 2 The courts, acting in loco parentis,
reasoned that the child would benefit most from an informal proceeding under a system which allowed the state some flexibility
and latitude in exercising its custodial duty. 3 However, with the
passage of time, the theoretical goals of the juvenile justice system
became questioned more frequently by the courts. In 1952 the Appellate Court of the 2d District of California found that:
[W]hile the juvenile court law provides that the adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed
to be a conviction of crime, nevertheless, for all practical
purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to
credulity and doing violence to reason. 4
The fiction the California court spoke of was the discrepancy
between how the juvenile court was to operate in theory and how
it functioned in fact. Informal proceedings without procedural safeguards were theoretically in the best interest of the child,' 5 but
in actuality, the juvenile court frequently did "nothing more nor
6
less than deprive a child of liberty without due process of law..... ,,
A significant increase in the juvenile crime rate added to the
problems of the juvenile justice system.' 7 To say that juvenile
courts have failed to reduce or even stem the tide of delinquency
is to say no more than what is true of adult criminal courts
10. TASK FORCE REPORT at 3.
11. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
12. Comment, The Conflict of Parens Patriae and Constitutional Concepts of Juvenile
Justice, 6 LINCOLN L. REV. 65 (1970).
13. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
14. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (2d Dirt. 1952). See
United States v. Dickersen, 168 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.D.C. 1950'); Shioutakon v. District
of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
15. TASK FORCE REPORT at 9.
16. Id.
17.
TASK FORCE REPORT at 1, citing FBI UNIORM CRImE REPORTS 28 (1965).

NOTES

in the United States."' "But failure is most striking when hopes
are highest." 19 With the rising number of juvenile crimes, the
courts in most cases were unable to allot more than a few minutes
to the consideration of the numerous factors important in a rehabilitative effort. 20 In addition, many of the "modern" juvenile reformatories and training schools were plagued by the same defects and
deficiencies

as the early juvenile institutions.21 The promise

of

the juvenile justice system was seemingly unfulfilled and, consequently, the reliability of juvenile proceedings was questioned with
22
increased tenacity.
In 1966 the Supreme Court of the United States had an opportunity
to evaluate the juvenile court system in Kent v. United States. 28
The Court dealt with the procedures followed in transferring a case
from a juvenile court to an adult criminal court pursuant to the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act. Writing for the majority,
Justice Fortas found that the juvenile court's latitude to waive
jurisdiction was not complete. 24 The Court held that in order for
a juvenile court to waive jurisdiction it must afford the juvenile
the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as
comply with the statutory requirement of a "full investigation. ' 25
This decision did not direct itself to the application of the constitutional safeguards of the adult criminal court, but Justice Fortas
cast some doubt on the validity of the parens patriae doctrine when
he stated:
There is much evidence that some juvenile courts ... lack the
personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately
as representative of the state in a parens patriae capacity,
at least with respect to children charged with law violation.
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for
18.
19.

TASK FORCE REPORT at 7.

Id.

20. TASK FORCE REPORT at 7, citing CAL. Gov.'s SPECIAL STUDY ON JUVENILE JUSTICE,
A STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA P-1.2, 16 (1960).

21. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1233 (1970), citing A. DEUTSCH, OUR REJECTED CHILDREN 15 (1950). Mr. Deutsch
revealed that the conditions that haunted the first Juvenile refornmatories had persisted:
The disciplinary or punishment barracks--sometimes these veritable cell blocks were more
foreboding than adult prisons-were known officially as 'adjustment cottages', or 'lost
privilege cottages'. Guards were 'supervisors'. Employees who were often little more than
caretakers and custodians were called 'cottage parents'. Isolation cells were 'meditation
rooms'.

22. See United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.D.C. 1958); Shioutakon
V. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re Contreras, 109 Cal.
App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631, (2d Dist. 1952). See generally Schwerin, supra note 9, at 422.
23. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
24. Id. at 552-53. For an xcellent discussion of the rationale of the Kent decisi~n
and its relationship to Gault see Welch, Kent v. United States and In Re Gault: Two Deciions in Search of a Theory, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 29 (1967).
25. Ken v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 654 (1966). For a discussion of waiver and
the balancing test see Note, Double Jeopardy and fhe Waiver of Jurisdiction in California's Juvenile Courts, 24 STAN. L. REV. 874 (1972).
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concern that the child . . . gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative
26
treatment postulated for children.

B. THE Gault DECISION
Only sixteen months after Kent, the Supreme Court delivered
its opinion in In re Gault,21 a landmark decision that completely
revolutionalized the procedural aspects of the juvenile justice system.
In an informal hearing before an Arizona juvenile court, fifteen
year old Gerald Gault was charged with making a lewd or indecent
telephone call to a woman. Gault was committed as a juvenile
delinquent to the State Industrial School "for the term of the child's
minority, unless sooner discharged. ' ' 28 He received a maximum
sentence of six years, whereas an adult would have faced a maximum sentence of a $50 fine or two months imprisonment for the
same offense. 29 In addition to the dichotomy between adult and
juvenile sentencing, Gault was denied the benefit of many of the
constitutional safeguards to which an adult would have been entitled.
Neither Gault nor his parents received notice of the charge, counsel
was not present, the state obtained Gault's confession and used
it against him, and he did not have an opportunity to confront the
prosecuting witness. 0 The Supreme Court determined that the
constitutional guarantee of due process applied to proceedings in
which a juvenile was charged with delinquency.-" More specifically,
the Court held that (1) adequate notice must be furnished to the
juvenile and his parents, 32 (2) the child and his parents must
be informed of their right to counsel,3 3 (3) the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to juvenile court proceedings,8 4 and (4) the juvenile must have an opportunity to confront
the prosecuting witness.83
The majority opinion in Gault did not address all of the constitutional safeguards that are afforded to an adult in a criminal proceeding, but rather, limited the scope of its decision to the above26. Rent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
27. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760, 764 (1965); ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 8-236 (1956).
29. Aiz. RLv. STAT. ANN. § 13 377 (1956).
30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
31. Id. at 30-31.
32. Id. at 33.
33. Id. at 41. For an excellent discussion of the problems surrounding the right to
counsel in juvenile proceedings see Welch, Delinquency Proceedings--FundamentalFairness for the Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MiNN. L. REv. 653, 6801 (1966). See
generally Weiss, The Emerging Rights of Minors, 4 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 25 (1972).
34.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).

35. Id. at 57. For discussion of the questions left unanswered in Gault, see Comment,
In re Gault and the Persisting Questions of ProceduralDue Process and Legal Ethics in
Juvenile Courts, 47 NEB. L. REv. 5518 (1968).
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mentioned rights. Indeed, Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion,
complained that the majority had failed "to provide any discernible
standard for the measurement of due process in relation to juvenile
proceedings .... ,"6As a further limitation, the Court recognized
that a juvenile proceeding had three distinct phases-pre-judicial,
adjudicative, and dispositional-and restricted its holding to the
adjudicative phase.8 7 The Court regarded both the prejudicial and
dispositional phases as flexible and adaptable to the special needs
of the juvenile,8 8 reasoning that these stages offer the states latitude
to further the rehabilitative goals that have historically characterized the philosophy of the juvenile court. 89 In contrast, the Court
found that the adjudication of delinquency, in itself, had relatively
little to contribute to the rehabilitative goal. Thus, there was little
justification for departing from the constitutionally protected pro40
cedures for determining guilt.
Although the parens patriaephilosphy was not rejected entirely,4'
its traditional application to the adjudicative phase was rejected.
The Court recognized that the consequences of being found delinquent in the adjudication hearing were comparable to a finding
2
of guilt and subsequent conviction in an adult criminal court.4
Accordingly, it held that the possible loss of liberty was a conse4
quence that demanded application of the guarantees of due process . 3
C. In re Winship:

THE STANDARD OF PROOF

In 1970 a fifth element was added to the requirements of due
process in juvenile proceedings. In the case of In re Winship,4" the
Supreme Court declared that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
36.

In

re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 67

(1967).

For articles dealing with the effect of the

(alt
decision, see Note, Delinquency and Denied Rights in Florida's Juvenile Court System, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 369 (1968) ; Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers,
53 A.B.A.J. 811 (1967); Comment, In re Gault: Children are People, 55 CALIF. L. REV.

1204 (1967).
37. In re Gault, 837 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
38. Id. See also Dorsen and Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1
VAM. L. 0.

No. 4, 9 (1967).

39. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
40. Id.
41. Id. The Court stated that the "civil" label was still appropriate in protecting
the Juvenile from being branded a criminal as a consequence of a delinquency adjudication.
42. Id. at 23-24.
43. Id. at 31. The Supreme Court felt that
[A] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable
in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The Juvenile needs the assistance of
counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts,
to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has
a defense and to prepare and submit it.
Id. at 36. See generally Welch, Kent v. United Stoates and In
in Search of a Theory, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 29, 35 (1967).

44.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

Re

Gault: Two Decisions
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is the standard to be applied in juvenile proceedings." The defendant
in the case was a twelve year old boy accused of taking $112
from a woman's handbag. He was convicted of robbery under
the preponderance of the evidence standard and thereafter committed until he reached the age of eighteen. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the use of the "reasonable doubt standard" would tend to negate the advantages now enjoyed by the
juvenile system, noting that the "reasonable doubt standard" would
assure the juvenile of greater protection from the possibility of
confinement on the basis of insufficient evidence. 4 The Court reasoned that proof beyond a reasonable doubt should have been the
standard and concluded that "[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult
I
apply as well to the innocent child." 4
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger expressed a
fear that the majority opinion was a "protest against inadequate
juvenile court staffs and facilities." ' "8 He reasoned that these inadequacies should not be used to turn juvenile proceedings into criminal
courts, since that would eliminate the meritorious aspects of the juvenile system. 49 However, Justice Burger failed to recognize that
the adoption of the reasonable doubt standard is not inconsistent
with the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile proceeding. 0° In any
event, the loss of liberty without due process of law must be
the primary consideration in evaluating a procedure that conflicts
with the original juvenile justice concept.
III. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

A.

JURY TRIAL-ADULT CRIMINAL CASES

Despite the guarantee of the United States Constitution of
a right to trial by jury,51 it was not until 1968 that the Supreme
52
extended the Sixth Amendment
Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana,'
guarantee to state adult criminal trials. In Duncan, the defendant
was convicted of simple battery, a misdemeanor under Louisiana
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
JUnos, J.
our proud
at 15.
48.

at 368.
at 367-68.
at 365. See Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due Process of Law, 19 Juv. CT.
No. 1, 9, 15 (1968). Justice Douglas argued that: "Equal justice under law Is
boast. There is no reason why it cannot be realized in the juvenile field." Id.

In re Winship, 397 U.S.

858, 376 (1970).

49. Id.
60. See Cohen, The Standard of Proof in Juvenile Proceedings: Gault Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 68 MicH. L. Rav. 567, 602 (1970).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury....
52. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

NOTES

law punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment and a
$300 fine. He sought a trial by jury, but because the Louisiana Constitution granted jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment
or imprisonment at hard labor could be imposed, the request was
denied by the trial judge. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that trial by jury was a fundamental right which must be
extended by the states to all defendants charged with serious criminal offenses.53 The Court considered the arguments against allowing
54
untrained laymen to determine the facts in a criminal proceeding.
However, the majority rejected the contention that juries were
incapable of adequately understanding evidence or determining issues
of fact. Justice White, speaking for the majority, argued that:
[Tihe most recent and exhaustive study of the jury in criminal cases concluded that juries do understand the evidence
and come to sound conclusions in most of the cases presented
to them and that when juries differ with the result at which
the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are
serving some of the very purposes for which they were created and for which they are now employed. 5
The Court indicated that the jury serves several positive functions:
(1) involving the community in the judicial process, (2) mitigating
the harshness of the law in light of local values, and (3) buffering
the defendant from arbitrariness on the part of the judge or prosecutor. 6
In Bloom v. Illinois,5 7 the Supreme Court reinforced Duncan
by holding that the right to trial by jury must be extended to criminal contempt for willfully petitioning to admit a falsely prepared
and executed will. In comparing convictions for criminal contempt
with those obtained under criminal law, the court determined that
it was the loss of liberty and not the name given to the offense
which demanded the fundamental right of trial by jury.5 8 In holding
that the right to a jury trial must be extended to criminal contempt
cases, the court stated:
53. Id. at 149. The Court held that the Due Process Clause requires a jury trial for
serious crimes. To distinguish petty and serious offenses, the Court referred to the federal authority in which a serious offense was defined as one in which incarceration for
more than six months had been set. Id. at 161.
54. Id. at 157. The debate Included express or Implied assertions that Juries are Incapable of adequately understanding evidence or determining Issues of fact and that
juries are "unpredictable, quixotic, and little better than a role of dice."
55.

Id.

See also Norton, What a Jury Is,

16 VA. L.

REv. 261, 266 (1930)

Jury on Trial, 14 A.B.A.J. 507, 509 (1928).
56. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
57. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
58. Id. at 207-08. See State v. Turner, 453 P.2d 910, 913 (Ore. 1969).

; Corbin, The
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[W]hen serious punishment for contempt is contemplated,
rejecting a demand for jury trial cannot be squared with the
Constitution or justified by considerations of efficiency. . 9
°
In DeBacker v. Brainard"
the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to direct itself to the question of whether a juvenile is entitled
to trial by jury. However, the majority sidestepped the issue and
ruled that because the juvenile hearing in question was held prior
to the decision in Duncan and since Duncan was not effective
retroactively, the petitioner had no right to trial by jury.6 1 In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments require a jury trial as a matter of right
where a juvenile is charged with an offense that would be triable
by a jury if committed by an adult.62 The fact that a jury trial
may be in conflict with the underlying philosophy of the juvenile
justice system is irrelevant since the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land. 23 Emphasizing the fact that the traditional juvenile
justice concept did not entail a criminal trial which evaded the
Constitution, Justice Douglas concluded that:

Where there is a criminal trial charging a criminal offense,
whether in conventional terms or in the language of delinquency, all of the procedural requirements of the Constitution
and Bill of Rights come into play.6
B.

JUVENILES

DENIED

TRIAL

BY

JuRY-McKeiver v. Pennsyl-

vania
In light of the Supreme Court decisions in Duncan and Bloom,
coupled with the proposition of fair treatment and the -essentials
of due process expounded in Kent and Gault, the Supreme Court's
denial of trial by jury to a juvenile in the case of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania65 came as a surprise.6 6 In McKeiver, sixteen year old
Joseph McKeiver was charged with robbery, larceny and receiving
stolen goods. He had allegedly participated with twenty or thirty
other juveniles in pursuing three teenagers and taking twenty-five
cents from them. A request for a jury trial was denied. The Pennsyl59. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).
60. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 35. See Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due Process ol Law, 19 Juv. CT.
JUDGES J. No. 1, 9 (1968).
63. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 38 (1969) (dissentir4g opinion). See Peyton v.
Nord, 70 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716, 723 (1967).
64. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 38 (1969).
65. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
66. See Ketcham, MaKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Last Word on Juvenile Court Adjudications?, 57 CORNELL L. Rlv. 561, 568 (1972).
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vania Supreme Court held that the courts of Pennsylvania are not
constitutionally compelled to grant a jury trial.67 The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari and held that the Sixth
Amendment does not require a trial by jury in state juvenile delin6S
quency proceedings.
Petitioner contended that his proceeding was "substantially similar to a criminal trial" due to the application of the usual rules
of evidence, the availability of customary common law defenses,
and the similarity between adult and juvenile detention facilities.6,
The juvenile also contended that the theoretical benefits of a juvenile proceeding could be realized in the dispositional phase of the
hearing rather than by maintaining a different process of adjudi70
cation .
The Court was reluctant to grant the right of trial by jury to a
juvenile because it felt that the states had a right to develop juvenile
procedures in the future without the encumbrance of juries.71 The
Court recognized the problem of the present juvenile system but
did not feel that a jury trial would cure the existing defects.7 2 The
Court also reasoned that the right to trial by jury would remake
the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process- and would
eliminate the need for a juvenile proceeding separate from that for
4
adults .7
Speaking for the plurality, 5 Justice Blackmun rejected the principle that trial by jury improves the quality of fact-finding in
67.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). The MeKeiver Case is a combination of three cases which were all granted certiorari and heard together by the Supreme Court. The cases were: In re McKeiver, 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969);
In re Terry, 215 Pa. Super. 762, 255 A2d 922 (1969); In re Burrus, 4 N.C. App. 523,

167 S.E.2d 454. (1969).
In re Terry involved fifteen year old Edward Terry who was charged with conspiracy and assault and battery on a police officer when the officer intervened in a
fight. Terry was found delinquent at an adjudication hearing. Counsel's request for a
jury trial was denied.
In
re Burrus involved Barbara Burrus and a group of 45 other black children
ranging In age from 11 to 1.5. They were charged with willfully impeding traffic. Requests for jury trials were denied. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower courts determination that a jjury trial was not required.
68.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
69.
Id.
at 541-42. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. Rv.
1187, 1233 (1970).
70.
MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 542 (1971). See Comment, In re Gault
and The Persisting Questions of Procedural Due Process and Legal Ethics, i
Juventle
Courts, 47 NEB. L. Rv.
558 (1968).
71.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971). For a discussion, of the conflict that the juvenile court represents to the criminal justice system, see Miller, The
Dilemma of the Post-Gault Juvenile Court, 3 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1969).
72.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
73.
Id. at 551.
74. Id. But see Alper, The Children's Court at Three Score and Ten: Will It Survive
Gaultl 34 ALBANY L. REV. 46 (1959). Mr. Alper raises the question of whether the juvenile court is actually necessary and discusses some alternatives.
75.
The Court's decision is expressed in several interrelated opinions. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart, wrote the prevailing opinion.
The concurring opinion of Justice White is similar to the prevailing opinion, and, combined with Justice Harlan's special concurrence, made up a majority of the Court. Justice Brennan concurred and dissented. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Black dissented.
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the courts and

concluded that ".

.

. a jury is not a

necessary

part of every criminal process that is fair and equitable."'76 Despite
his majority opinion in Duncan, Justice White found no need for
a jury, stating in his concurring opinion in McKeiver: "Although
the function of a jury is to find the facts, that body is not necessarily
7
or even probably better at the job than the conscientious judge."'
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, took the position that
neither fundamental fairness nor the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required a jury for either adults or juveniles.78
Writing for the dissent, Justice Douglas voiced his concern that
a juvenile without the right to a trial by jury could be charged
with a violation of a criminal law and confined for periods of
time beyond that which an adult would be incarcerated for the same
offense.' 9 Consequently, he concluded that the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, require a jury trial for juveniles.80
IV.

RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL FOR JUVENILES?

The traditional objections advanced for denying a juvenile the
right to a jury trial are: (1) juries would detract from the informality of the juvenile court; (2) the jury as a fact-finder may not be
any more qualified than a juvenile judge; (3) the confidential nature
of the juvenile court would be eliminated; and, (4) the jury would
place an additional administrative burden on the juvenile courts.8 1
In light of Justice Douglas' dissent in McKeiver and Gault's apparent
rejection of the parens patriae theory in the adjudication phase
of a juvenile hearing, a thorough discussion of the validity of these
arguments is warranted.
A.

INFORMALITY

Under the parens patriae theory of juvenile justice, one of
the beneficial characteristics of the juvenile proceeding was the
informality of the juvenile court. 82 Moreover, the McKeiver decision
76. McKelver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
77. Id. at 551.
78. Id. at 557. The reason for allowing the right to trial by jury in Duncan was primarily historical. Another consideration may have been that all of the states provided
for Jury trials. In any event, it Is doubtful that those considerations, standing alone,
would provide adequate justification for providing juveniles the jury right. Yet, how much
weight should be given to the 70 year history of the juvenil court in this cotntext?
79. Id. at 559. See Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due Process of Law, 19 Juv. CT.
JUDGEs J. No. 1, 9 (1968).

80.
81.

McKeiver v. Permsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 553 (1971).
Paulsen, supra note 2, at 559; Comment, A Balancing Approach to the Grant of

ProceduralRights in the Juvenile Court, 64 Nw. U.L. REsv. 87, 113 (1969).

82.

See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 559.
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indicated that if the juvenile court was to continue under the parens
patriae theory, it had to retain its unique character rather than
become a fully adversary process. 83
In Gault the Supreme Court took issue with the traditional
application of the parens patriae philosophy and applied due process
requirements only to the adjudicative phase of the juvenile hearing."
The Court specifically stated:
We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of
the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile "delinquents." For example,
we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process. 5
However, in McKeiver, the Supreme Court did not focus on the
adjudicative phase, but rather, evaluated the entire juvenile system
in determining whether a juvenile had a right to trial by jury. The
plurality opinion reasoned that:
The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system
would . . . provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique manner. It would not
remedy the defects of the system. Meager as has been the
hoped for advance in the juvenile field, the alternative would
be regressive, would lose what has been gained, and would
tend once again to place the juvenile squarely in the routine
of the criminal process.8 6
The focus of the Supreme Court in Gault on the adjudicative phase
of the juvenile hearing is easily distinguished from the Court's
broad evaluation of the juvenile justice system in McKeiver. However, the Court's rationale for doing so is not as easily discernible.
In McKeiver the Court reasoned that a jury trial would not remedy
the defects of the juvenile system.8 7 But in Gault, it was for that
reason-a defective system-that the Court was motivated to require specific procedural safeguards. 88 Possibly, the underlying ra83. McKelver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
84. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1967). The Court's rattonale for so holding was
based upon the National Crime Commission Report which reconnended that: "Juvenile
Courts should make fullest feasible use of the preliminary conference to dispose of cases
short of adjudication." The Court further explained that the problems of pre-adJudicaton
and postLadJudication disposition were unique to the Juvenile process.
85
Id. at 18.
86. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
87. Id.
88. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967).
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tionale for denying a juvenile the right to trial by jury was the
Supreme Court's determination that a reasonable balance had been
established between due process rights and traditional juvenile
court informality. 89
With the procedural requirements now applicable in the juvenile
courts as a result of Gault, how much formality would be added
by the presence of a jury? Some courts have maintained that
the right to trial by jury would result in a juvenile proceeding
that would be identical to an adult criminal proceeding.
Instead of a hearing in juvenile court largely in the procedure of a court of equity, he is given a formal trial before
a jury where the main issue will be whether or not he has
committed a crime. This defeats the main purpose of the
Juvenile Court Act, . . . and reinstates the evils of trying
young juveniles on the same basis as adult criminals. 0
Gault guaranteed the juvenile the right to counsel in the juvenile
hearing. 91 If any may assume that the attorney's primary role in
the adjudication of delinquency is the protection of the juvenile's
rights, then it follows that some elements of the adversary system
cannot be avoided. The following quotation expresses the sentiments
of one judge as to the character of the changes wrought by the
Gault decision:
Gault assures the juvenile the right to inject into the proceeding the right to inject into the proceeding all of the "clash
and clamor" of an adversary proceeding that his counsel
wishes to employ in asserting the due process rights specified in that opinion. Gault having permitted these inroads
upon the traditional rehabilitative process, the basic character of the courtroom setting is changed from one of quiet
communion between judges and child to that of an adversary
arena92 of the ordinary law suit if the child or his parent so
elect .
However, there are several commentators who do not feel that
the attorney in a juvenile hearing is restricted to an advocate's
89. McKelver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). See Note, Double Jeopardy
and the Waiver of Jurisdiction in Californa' Juvenile Cou~its, 24 STAN. L. REv. 874,
893-94 (1972). The author stated that the balancing test was evident in Winship and
overt in MaKeiver.
90. DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 474, 161 N.W.2d 503, 515 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 28 (1969). See Estes v. Hopp, 438 P.2d 205, 20,8 (Wash. 1968); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9, 12 (1967).
91. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
92.
State v. Turner, 453 P.2d 910, 915 (Or. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
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role. 8 Besides serving an important role at the dispositional stage,
the attorney may defend his client in a manner appropriate to
the juvenile court setting.
Although the attorney should accept the juvenile's wishes
and defend the case, he should make it clear that his objective is to present a competent defense-and no more. He
needs to impress upon his client that his responsibility is not
to obstruct the state's presentation or to "win" the case,
but rather to attempt to see that his client will be found
delinquent only if legally dependable evidence is presented
against him.94
If one concludes that a trial by jury will result in additional
formality in the juvenile adjudication, the question arises as to
what affect the additional formality will have on the traditional
juvenile concept. In Gault, Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority, concluded that the features of the juvenile system that are
supposedly of unique benefit would not be impaired by "constitutional domestication." 9 5 As one commentator noted, providing a
formal procedure for the adjudication of a juvenile's guilt may
prove beneficial to his rehabilitation.
The child and his parents are under no illusion. They know
they are in court, not in school or at a doctor's office. To
find a court acting like a court may only bear out the expectation derived from television.9 6
The majority opinion in Gault also reasoned that the appearance
of a court might have a rehabilitative effect on the juvenile.
The appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due process
-may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude
so far as the juvenile is concerned. 97
Although the Supreme Court in Gault was not speaking directly
to the issue of trial by jury in juvenile proceedings, the same
argument could be made for the jury right. Such an argument,
93. See Skoler, The Right to Counsel and the Right of Counsel in Juvenile Court Prooceedings. 43 IND. L.J. 558, 578 (1968); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 34.
94. Comment, In re Gault and The Persisting QueStions of Procedural Due Process
and Legal Ethics in Juvenile Courts, 47 Nnn. L. REv. 558, 591 (1968). But see Paulsen,
Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527, 538 (1968).
95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
96. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
SUP. C. Rlv. 167, 186.
97. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
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however, was not made in McKeiver. Furthermore, it is doubtful
that the Court would have given the therapeutic value of a jury trial
any significant weight in balancing the traditional juvenile concept
due process requirements.
B.

THE JURY AS A FACT-FINDER

Another objection to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings is that
a jury may not be any more qualified than a judge to find the
facts.9 8 McKeiver echoed this sentiment in finding that the jury
right was less fundamental than the juveniles' rights advanced
in Gault and Winship and was not a necessary component of accurate fact-finding. 99 However, the opposing argument is not without
merit. One commentator noted that a jury does not develop patterns
and classifications that a judge often falls into as a matter of routine. 100 A jury affords ". .
protection against jaded judges who
hear case after case, day in and day out, and decide on past prejudices rather than present evidence."''1 1 From a constitutional standpoint, there is no reason for denying a juvenile the basic safeguards
that Duncan provided adults in criminal proceedings. The Supreme
Court reasoned that:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury
of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the complaint,
10 2
biased, or eccentric judge.
Justice White, concurring in McKeiver, stated that a jury "is
not necessarily or even probably better at the job than the conscientious judge."'0 8 But how much emphasis should be placed on a
juvenile judge's expertise and conscientiousness? A survey conducted
in 1965 showed that half of the juvenile judges did not have undergraduate degrees, a fifth had no college education at all, and
juvenile hearings were little more than interviews of ten or fifteen
minutes duration.104 Even if one could be sure of the judge's qualifications and compassion for juveniles, what standards and control
does the juvenile justice system offer to protect the juvenile from
98.

TAsK FORCE REPORT at 38; Paulsen, supra note 2, at 599.
99. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
100. Corbin, The Jury on Trial, 14 A.B.A.J. 507, 509 (1928) ; See Norton, What a Jury
Xs, 16 VA. L. REV. 261, 266 (1930).
101. Comment, Criminal Offenders in Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. P. L. REv. 1171, 1187-88 (1966).
102. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
103. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (emphasis added).
1C4. TASK FORCE REPORT at 7.
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arbitrary decisions? In Gault, Justice Fortas noted the danger of
unlimited discretion, concluding that:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principal and procedure. 10 5
The argument made by the petitioner in McKeiver is noteworthy.
The juvenile contended that the adjudication and disposition are
two separate procedural phases; therefore, the desired protection
of the juvenile could be adequately provided in the dispositional
phase. 1 6 The McKeiver opinion did not distinguish between the
adjudicative and dispositional phases in denying juveniles the right
to a jury trial. Yet, a jury could be utilized in the adjudicative
phase as the fact-finder, while a judge's experience and training
could be utilized best in the dispostional phase of the juvenile
proceeding where the mode of treatment and rehabilitation is determined.
Our system of justice allows a person confronted with the possible loss of his liberty the right to have a body of his peers
summoned to find the truth. Some courts have held that the right
to jury trial is applicable to juvenile proceedings. 10 7 The Supreme
Court of New Mexico stated:
We see no escape from the conclusion that at the time of
the adoption of our constitution petitioner [a juvenile] could
not have been imprisoned without a trial by jury. This being
true, no change in terminology or procedure may be invoked
whereby incarceration could be accomplished in a manner
which involved denial of the right to jury trial. 108
In any event, the concern should be for the right of a juvenile
to trial by jury and not over which fact-finder is better for the job.
C.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Another traditional objection
is the consequential destruction
proceedings. 0 9 Confidentiality is
proceeding in order to protect

to trial by jury in juvenile cases
of the confidential nature of the
deemed necessary to the juvenile
the juvenile from the stigma of

105.
106.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 542 (1971).
,
RLR V. State, 487 P.2d 27, 35 (Alaska 1971) ; Nieves v. United States, 280 F.
Supp. 994, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716, 723 (1967).
108. Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716, 723 (1967).

107.
109.

Paulsen, supra note 2, at 560; Mack, supra note 1, at 109.
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criminality which results from public exposure." 0 However, in Gault,
Justice Fortas pointed out that the claim of confidentiality was
mere rhetoric and did not exist in reality."' The McKeiver decision
did not specifically mention the confidential nature of juvenile proceedings, but the Court's concern for the unique manner 12 of the
juvenile proceeding and its fear of a totally adversary"18 proceeding may indicate that the potential loss of confidentiality was considered by the Court.
Should the juvenile, with the advice of counsel, ultimately determine whether to forego a confidential hearing and elect trial
by jury? As one commentator has noted, the juvenile who aggressively protests the formal accusations in the petition is "more interested in seeking the most expedient means of proving his innocence
than in making certain his hearing remains completely confidential." 114 However, Dean Paulson maintains that a juvenile's best
interest is not served by allowing a jury trial because of the consequential publicity.
An open trial would operate as a check on arbitrary action
by the court; but the advantage would be purchased at the
expense of punishing the juvenile by publicity. The goals of
protecting a young person from the misconduct of his youth,
and of informing the community how its courts operate in
every case, cannot be pursued simultaneously." 15
A jury trial does not necessarily mean that a public trial must
follow. The exclusion of the public from the court proceeding may
be a solution. In this way the confidential nature of the juvenile
proceeding could be retained, while providing the juvenile with the
right to a trial by jury.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES
Another objection to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings is the
resulting administrative burden. 116 The McKeiver opinion, on its
face, did not consider the impact of a jury trial on the administrative
functioning of juvenile courts. However, one commentator has suggested that ".
. the practical consequences on the administrative
110.
Mack, supra note 1, at 109; But see Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WiS. L. REv. 7, 17.
111.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
112.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 4,03 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
113. Id. at 550.
114.
Note, A Due Process Dilemma-Juries For Juveniles, 45 N.D. L. REv. 251, 269
(1969).

115. Paulsen, Fairness 'to 'the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 560 (1957).
116. See Comment, A Balancing Approach to the Grant of Procedural Rights in
Juvenfle Court, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 87, 113 (1969).
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functioning of state juvenile courts played a large part in the Court's
decision to deny juveniles a right to jury trial." 117 The experience
of the District of Columbia would seem to bear this out.
Prior to 1970, the District's juvenile courts had statutory
authority to grant jury trials. Until the mid-1960's, this right
was only infrequently invoked. During the period, 1965-1969,
use of the jury demand substantially increased. By the end
of fiscal 1969, 290 jury cases were pending, with a consequent
effect of increasing the delays in all juvenile court matters.
: I , As a result . .. Congress repealed the juvenile jury right
in the District of Columbia.""S
However, considering the high number of admissions of guilt in
juvenile proceedings, 119 the fear of administrative backlog would
appear to be exaggerated. In fact, many jurisdictions which allow
jury trials for juveniles have not experienced any notable delay
20
or overburdening of the juvenile courts."
The foregoing discussion of jury trials for juveniles has focused
on either the jury trial as a matter of right or the absolute denial
of that right. As another alternative, one writer has suggested
a middle of the road approach whereby only a juvenile who realistically faces the possibility of incarceration would be entitled to
a trial by jury.' 2 Under that approach, if a jury trial is not
12
afforded in serious cases, the juvenile may not be committed.
Other compromises with respect to the juvenile jury right exist
in several jurisdictions: (1) a jury of six persons is allowed in some
jurisdictions; 1 2 (2) a jury is available on appeal in another jurisdiction;1 24 (3) in yet another jurisdiction a young adult advisory
25
panel is available to assist the judge in determining the facts."
These solutions significantly lessen the impact of the jury requirement on the administrative functioning of the juvenile courts. In
any event, a juvenile should not be denied the right to a trial by
jury when he denies his guilt merely because it will take more
time and money.
117.
Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennvylvania: The Last Word on Juvenile Court Adjudications?, 57 0ORNELL L. REv. 561, 568 (1972).
118. Carrr,' Juries For Juveniles: Solving the Dilemma, 2 LOYOLA L.J. 1, 22-23 (1971).
119. TASK FORCE REPORT at 9.
120. See Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 794 (1966).
121. Cart, supra note 118, at 9.
122. Id.
123. MIcE. COmp. LAWS ch. 712 A § 17 (1968) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1110 (Supp.
1972-73).
124. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 56 (Supp. 1973).
125. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.075 (Supp. 1971).
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V. CONCLUSION
In holding that a juvenile does not have a constitutional right
to a trial by jury, the United States Supreme Court avoided expressing complete disillusionment with the parens patriae philosophy
in the adjudicative phase of the juvenile justice system. The Kent,
Gault, and Winship decisions eliminated some of the inequities
and arbitrary procedures from a failing system that was based
on an unfulfilled promise. However, the McKeiver decision voiced
a faint hope for the high promise of the parens patriae concept.
The Supreme Court held that individual states have the privilege, but not the obligation, to allow jury trials in their juvenile
proceedings. 126 The Court also determined that juvenile court judges
may use an advisory jury whenever they deem it necessary in
a particular case.127 This attitude does not indicate an overwhelming
approval of the parens patriae theory of juvenile justice, but rather,
only a tolerance for what it believes to be a commendable goal.
The McKeiver decision may be viewed as a warning to the states.
They will be allowed to re-examine their juvenile systems and
to make constructive changes without further constitutional impediments. However, if the states do not correct existing deficiencies,
128
the Supreme Court may very well reverse its present position.
CARLAN 3. KRAFT

126. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
127. Id. at 548. See also Ex parte State v. Simpson, 263 So.2d 137 (1972). The Alabama Supreme Court said:
[W]e think that the court has the power to provide for a jury trial in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding and to consider the verdict as being only
advisory. That discretionary power to invoke a jury's assistance should be
exercised only in situations where the court is satisfied that a jury's advice
will be helpful toward a just disposition of the adjudication of delinquency.
When a jury is utilized, the court must continue to protect the accused from
undue public attention....
Id. at 139.
128. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Justice Blackmun, speaking for
the plurality, stated:
Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.
Id. at 551.

